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Defendants and Appellants.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT
of Salt Lake County

STATE OF UTAH
BURTON BIRKINSHAW and
VIRGINIA E. BIRKINSHAW,
Plamtiffs,

vs.

Case Xo. 33

ROBERT R. BADERTSCHER and
GERALDINE L. BADERTSCHER,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

This is an appeal from only that part of the judgSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment made and entered on the 5th day of March, 1958,
in which the Court ordered that ''no attorneys fees are
awarded to Defendants from Plaintiffs" (Tr. 13).
In this case Plaintiffs are the assignees of a seller
under a uniform real estate contract. The fee holder
one, Ivan 0. Burke (a widower), on the 11th day of
January 1956 entered into a real estate contract to sell
his interest to James A. Hatch and Ruth B. Hatch,
his wife. Hatch and his wife in turn entered into a real
estate contract with Defendants and appellants herein,
Robert R. Badertscher and Geraldine L. Badertscher,
wherein the B.adertschers also by virtue of a uniform
real estate contract became the buyers and James A.
Hatch and Ruth B. Hatch, his wife, became the sellers
of the interest in the land heretofore acquired under
the contract above mentioned between Burke and the
Hatches.
Thereafter, to wit, on the 27th day of December,
1956, the Hatches assigned their interest in the contracts
to Dennis H. Anderson and Ruth M. Anderson, his
wife. Andersons thereafter, on the 15th day of January,
1957, assigned all of their interest in said contract to
Burton Birkinshaw and Virginia Birkinshaw, husband
and wife, who are the Plaintiffs in the lower Court and
the Respondents herein.
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In order to more clearly illustrate the devolvement
of title appellants have set forth the following diagram:
DIAGRAM SHOWING DE.;VOLVEMENT OF
EQUITABLE INTERESTS IN AND TO A CERTAIN
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
Civil No. 114403
Burk
SELLS
(Uniform R. E . .Contract) (I infra)
Hatch, et ux
Hatch et us ........................................................ Hatch et ux
SELL

ASSIGNS (3)

(Uniform R. E. Contract) (2)
Badertscher (Def.)

Anderson et ux
Anderson et ux
ASSIGN (4)
Birkinshaw (Plf.)

Badertscher sues ................................................ Birkinshaw (Plf.)

The real estate, the subject of this action is situated
in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and
described as follows:
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Commencing at a point 3 rods South of the
Northwest corner of Lot 4, Block 57, Plat "B",
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence East
10 rods, thence South 4 rods; thence West 10
rods; thence North 4 rods to the place of beginning.
Plaintiffs and Respondents herein, after having
given notice to Defendants and Appellants herein commenced an action for unlawful detainer alleging that
under and by virtue of the real estate contract and assignment Defendants and Appellants had failed to comply with the terms of said agreement and that they
were therefore entitled to the immediate restitution and
possession of the premises, togethtr with a cancellation
of the uniform real estate contract, for treble damages
for each day holding over as provided by law and for
costs.
Defendants denied all of the allegations of the complaint and further, under and by virtue of the following
provision, contained in said uniform re.al estate contract,
to wit, "should they default in any of the covenants and
agreements contained herein, to pay all costs and expenses that may arise from enforcing this agreement,
either by suit or otherwise, including .a reasonable attorney's fee" asked the Court for an award of a reasonable attorney fee, they having been compelled to engage
the service of an attorney.
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The trial came on for hearing January 14, 1958,
before the Hon. Aldon J. Anderson, one of the Judges
of the District Court sitting without a jury.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
The Court erred in denying Defendants and appellants herein, a reasonable attorney's fee under the provisions of said real estate contract.
ARGUMENT
The Plaintiffs and Respondents herein relied solely
on the real estate contract to support any cause of action
they may have had which recites as follows:
''That the buyers and seller agree that should
they default in any of the covenants and agreements contained herein, to pay all costs and expense that may arise fr01n enforcing this agreement, either by suit or othenvise, including a
reasonable attorneys fee.''
Plaintiffs and Respondents herein couunenced an
action which they were unable to sustain, but which nonetheless Defendants and Appellants herein were compelled
to defend in order to protect their interest in the real
property. The very purpose of the provision in the
contract was to help guard .against the situation which
Respondents have caused by the comn1enre1nent of an
action upon whieh they were unable to reeoYer and therefore unable to sustain. It was not appellant's doing but
solely respondents' who cre.ated the situation whereby
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appellants were compelled to engage counsel to protect
their equity in the property.
All of the parties relied solely on the uniform real
estate contract to establish the respective interests of
each in the land described therein. The contract provides
for the payment of a reasonable attorney's fee, and all
expenses incident to the enforcement of the contract. The
attorney's fee therefore immediately becomes a matter
to be considered along with other expenses in the enforcement of the contract.
As to the question of attorney's fees and the
agreement between the parties to p.ay an attorney's fee
in case of a default in the terms by either of the parties
the Honorable Court in 1909 in the case of McCorniJck
vs. Swen, 36 Utah 6, 102 Pac. 626, held that 'a provision
in a promissory note, by which the maker agrees to
pay a reasonable sum as attorney's fees, does not render
the note non-negotiable. This early Utah case was reaffirmed in Uta,h National Bank of Salt Lake City vs.
Selson, 38, Utah 169,, 111 Pac. 907. In 15 Utah 308, 49
Pac. 777, Salisbury vs. Stewart (1897), this Court held:
''the fact that the makers of a promissory note undertake
to pay an attorney's fee if suit be brought to enforce
the collection of the note doer not resder the note nonnegotiable. The Court: ''It appears right that the parties
whose default caused the expense should pay it; that
it should not be imposed upon the party who kept his
contract. The party who keeps a contract should receive
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from the one who breaks it compensation for his loss.
If the defendants had kept their contract, the holder
would have received $3,500 and the interest. They not
having done so, the stipulation and the law required
the makers to pay him that a1nount, and no more, for his
own use, and to pay the costs of the court and attorney's
fee. Only the costs of the court could have been charged
against the defendants without the stipulation. The stipulation, in effect, also added the fee of the attorney, if
one should be employed to bring the suit, to the costs
imposed by the law upon the defendants. The fee is for
the attorney. If the employment of an attorney does
not become necessary, or if one is not employed, the court
should not .allow suh a fee, and the allowance should not
exceed the amount charged by the attorney. The allowance is not as a penalty, as interest, or as a bonus. It
is simply to pay the costs of enforcing the collection
of the note by suit.''
146 ALR 672, 836.
14 Anl. J ur. 586, #159: "vVhile there is SOllie conflict
with respect to the right of the grantee in a deed to
recover from his grantor, in an action for breach of .a
covenant of title, counsel fees incurred by him in unsuccessfully defending the title to the premises, according to the gre'at weight of authority the reasonable
attorney's fees which the plaintiff was required to pay
or for which he has bec01ne legally obligated to pay in
his atte·Inpt to defend the title are recoverable. ln other
words, the reasonable expense necessarily incurred for
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attorney's fees in defending the title is considered a
legitimate outcome of the failure of the title 'and a proper
element of damages to be allowed in an action for breach
of covenant, at least, where the covenantor is notified
of the action and does not undertake the defense. This
view regards counsel fees as the legitimate outcome of
the failure of title. This rule allowing attorneys' fees
to be recovered has been applied in actions involvng
breaches of covenants of warranty and covenants against
encumbrances.
In Moto.r Contract Co. vs. Van De Volgen, 162 Wash.
449; 298 PaCJ. 705, 79 ALR 29, the court held a stipulation in a conditional sales contract for the recovery of
a reasonable attorney fee to be fixed by the Court, is
not contrary to public policy.
See also 41 ALR 2nd 677.
The plaintiff in the present case was an assignee
of one of the original parties to said agreement and
therefore claims some sort of immunity to the terms
thereof. "It is well settled, however, that the 'assignee
takes subject to the assignment with all the rights hereto possessed by the assignor, and a claim good in the
hands of an assignor is ordinarily equally good and free
from defenses in the hands of his assignee. An assignee
of a non-negot~able chose in action ordinarily, however,
acquires no greater right than was possessed by his
assignor, but simply stands in the shoes of the latter.
He normally takes subject to all equities and defenses
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which could have been set up against the chose in the
hands of the assignor at the time of the 'assignment.''
(4 Am. Jur. 311, 103.)
4 Am. Jur. 311 Sec. 104.
ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT AS PASSING BENEFITS SUBJE·CT TO BURDENS: It
is not to be infered from the rule that the assignee
of a contract is not personally responsible to the
other party for the obligations imposed by the
contract on the assignor unless he assumes such
obligations, that he may enforce the contract without the performance of the obligations which it
imposes. On the contrary, he takes the right with
all the burdens to which it was subject in the
hands of the assignor ,and if he undertakes to
enforce the right by an action, he must show
that the conditions have been performed either
by his assignor or by himself. The assignee is
bound by the terms of the contract to the same
extent as the assignor.
It is not to be inferred from the rule that the assignee
of a contract is not personally responsible to the other
party for the obligations in1posed by the contract on
the assignor unless he a~~mnes such obligations, that
he may enforce he contract without the perfonnanee of
the obligations which it in1poses. On the contrary, he
takes the right with all the burdens to which it \\~as
subject in the hands of the assignor, and if he undertakes to enforce the right by an action, he must show
that the conditions have been perfonned either by his
assignor or by hiu1self. The assignee is bound by the
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terms o fthe contract to the same extent as the assignor.

Flo.riJda East Coast R. Co. v. Eno, 99 Fla. 887, 128
So. 622, 70 ALR 506: "When a contraetor assigns all
sums due or to become due him from the owner under
a construction contract, the assignee occupies the same
position as the assignor with respect to such moneys,
having the same right, and being subject to the same
equities, conditions, and defenses, the assignment not
being a negotiable instrument.
In the case of Robimson vs. Rispin, 165 P. 979
33 Cal. App. 536, the Court held that while mere
assignment of an executory contract does not make the
assignee liable to the other party, yet, where the contract is fully performed and the benefit inures solely
to the assignee, and he recognzes the contract as binding,
he is liable to the other party equally with his assignor.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs and respondents, by their interpretation of the contract and demands served on Defendants
and Appellants, plus the .action which they have brought
to enforce their demands, have forced Defendants to seek
counsel to defend themselves. The ultimate effect of
Plaintiffs' action was to foreclose Defendant's equity
in the premises, even though it is by a possessory action.
The effect is all the same. For this trouble and expense
Defendants are entitled to be reimbursed and to an
award of a reasonable attorney's fee.
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The matter of sustaining an agreement to pay a
reasonable attorney's fee has been reaffirmed many
times by this Court. The defendant was put to the expense of defending his interest in the land by virtue
of the contract which he had with one of the assignees
of the oriignal vendor. We therefore submit that the
action should be reassigned to the trial court for the
purpose of determining and awarding a reasonable attorney's fee.
Respectfully submitted,
LAMAR DUNCAN
DUNCAN and DUNCAN
Attorneys for Defendants
and A ppeU ants
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